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the United States Court of Claims, 2 3 have been held to be res
adjudicata. Therefore, we have a court of record, very similar to the
Supreme Court, and an appellate court, both having jurisdiction over
the action and acting judicially, rendering final decisions dismissing
the claim on the merits, and fully and finally determining the identical issues that are again presented in this action. The plaintiff has
had his opportunity to prove his contentions 24 and so, on principle
and on precedent, should not be permitted to try the identical issues
twice.
A.A.

MORTGAGE

PARTICIPATION

CERTIFICATEs.-A

guarantee com-

pany owned a $42,300 mortgage and sold participating certificates
therein, amounting to $40,475 to third parties, guaranteeing payment
of principal and interest. It repurchased one $100 certificate and at
all times retained an interest of $1,825 in the mortgage. The company
is now in liquidation and the plaintiff, as liquidator, seeks to determine
whether he is entitled to share -pro rata with the third parties, in the
proceeds of the mortgaged property. Held, two judges dissenting,
judgment in favor of plaintiff reversed. The guarantee company
issuing the certificates is notentitled to participate in the proceeds of
the mortgaged property-until all other holders of similar certificates
have been. paid in full. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d)
724 (1939).
.
. The problem of the priority of rights in the. distribution of the
proceeds of guaranteed mortgage certificate issues. of companies now
in liquidation has arisen in numerous instances between the certificate holders and the company' and the instant case is another example
of a situation where the company owns an equity represented by an
unsold portion of the mortgage and by a repurchased certificate.
It is well settled that a mortgagee who assigns an interest in his
mortgage does not, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
postpone his interest to that of his assignee. 2 To establish priority
v. Cook, 24 N. M. 202, 173 Pac. 682 (1918); State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 74
Atl. 2392 (1909) ; see FREEMAN, JUDGMENs (5th ed.) §§ 633, 1258.
3 United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641. (U: S. 1875).

24 Nor can plaintiff's contention, that h6 has been deprived of a jury trial,
be upheld. When a plaintiff has at his disposal two forms of actions or two
tribunals in which to commence it, and he elects the one which does not permit
him a jury trial, he is bound by his election and he"is estopped from complaining
about it later. See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N. E.
993 (1917) ; In re Pickard, 140 Misc. 541, 250 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1931).
1 N. Y. L. J., June 14, 1938, p. 2866, col. 1.
2 Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467, 477, 4 N. E. (2d) 830, 835 (1936);
Mechanics Bank v. Bank of Niagara, 9 Wend. 410 (N. Y. 1832); Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415, 7 N. E. (2d) 841
(1937).
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it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the parties by contractual
provisions in the certificate as such intention has always been regarded
as determinative of their rights.8 In the absence of an express or implied intention 4 the assignee will prevail when there is a relationship from which the courts will derive a special equity in his favor.
So, where the sale of a certificate is accompanied'by a guarantee, the
certificate holder has been generally accorded priority on the theory
that a relationship of debtor and creditor exists between the parties
and that a contrary holding would be inequitable as it would permit
the debtor to divert part of the security available to pay the certificate
holder.5
The courts in this state have not had much difficulty in finding
a special equity in favor of the assignee-or in applying the familiar
axiom that a contract will be construed strictly against the person
writing it.6 In the present case the certificate provided that it was
"equal and coordinate with all other shares assigned or retained by
the company." Any determination of actual intent to be gathered
3Wuennecke v. Hausmann, 216 Iowa 725, 247 N. W. 531 (1933) ; Mechanics
Bank v. Bank of Niagara, 9 Wend. 410 (N. Y. 1832); Matter of Lawyers
Mortgage Co., 151 Misc. 744, 272 N. Y. Supp. 390 (1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div.
617, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dept. 1934), leave to appeal denied, 265 N. Y.
508, 4193 N. E. 294 (1934).
Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (545 West End Ave.), 157 Misc. 813,
284 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1936), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 715, 290 N. Y. Supp. 129 (1st
Dept. 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 554, 4 N. E. (2d) 733 (1936); Walcott v. Carpenter, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 132 S. W. 981 (1910).
Contra: Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Atl. 823 (1934),
aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934).
5 Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Simon Borg), 151 Misc. 744, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 390 (1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 617, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dept
1934), affd, 265 N. Y. 508, 193 N. E. 294 (1934) ; Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (545 West End Ave.), 157 Misc. 813, 284 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1936),
aff'd, 248 App. Div. 715, 290 N. Y. Supp. 129 (1st Dept. 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y.
554, 4 N. E: (2d) 733 (1936).
6 Matter of Lawyers Title & Guarantee Co. (236 W. 70th St.), 164 Misc.
292, 298 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1938), where a certificate contained the provision
that it "is equal and co-ordinate with all other shares assigned or retained by
the company" and no language indicating that the company might own or hold
certificates with the same rights as other holders, a certificate repurchased by
the company was held subordinate to.the interest of the other certificate holders
in the issue. Matter of Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co. (223 Second Ave.),
169 Misc. 196, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 254 (1937), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 765, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 255 (1st Dept. 1938). Again certificates issued by a title company and
guaranteed by a subsidiary company provided that "the Company may, for its
own accounf, hold similar shares in the bond and mortgage". Because the
certificate contained no provision for the guaranteeing company to hold the
certificates, it was held that certificates acquired by the guarantee company were
subordinate to those of other certificate holders. Matter of New York Title
and Mortgage Co., 163 Misc. 196, 296 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1936). The same
result was reached where the certificate provided that "there shall be no priority
of preference in favor of any share in the mortgage". The court found that
the meaning of the word "share' was doubtful and since the certificates were
prepared by the title company any doubts or ambiguities must be resolved
against it.
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from these terms would seem to be in favor of pro rata distribution.
Yet the court held that the certificates retained and repurchased by
the company were subordinate to those held by third parties. It construed the words "equal and coordinate" to mean that the date of the
sale of different shares should not constitute a preference, and the
shares retained by the company should, when sold, be equal and coordinate with all other shares previously sold. As the court makes
no distinction between "retained" and "repurchased" certificates it
appears to be settled that both classes of certificates are subordinate
to those held by third parties.
Since the investing public placed considerable reliance on the
companies in the purchase of these certificates, 7 it would, at first impression, seem reasonable to place on the vendor the burden of proving the absence of special equities in favor of the purchaser of the
certificate. However, unless the "coordinate lien" clause is construed
to place the company's share of the bond and mortgage on a parity
with all others, it is rendered superfluous and meaningless. 8 The
holdings in other jurisdictions to the effect that, if the certificate does
not provide a clear and unambiguous solution of the problem, then
a pro rata distribution of the proceeds should be made, appear to be
the most equitable." Since the assignor has power to issue other certificates of coordinate lien up to the amount of the principal sum secured by the mortgage, the assignee cannot reasonably expect to be
secured beyond the amount of his pro rata share of the proceeds and
there is no reason why his position should be made more secure because the company happened to retain part of the mortgage.Y0
It is, perhaps, sound in principle to accord the assignee priority
when the assignor-guarantor is solvent, in order to avoid circuity of
action."' But, giving such priority to the assignee is merely a device
for enforcing the obligation of a solvent obligor without the necessity
of a separate suit, the priority not being based on any substantive
right of the certificate holder. Where the assignor is insolvent, however, the situation changes. Granting the assignee a priority for
which he has not clearly contracted is to prefer him over two interested groups. His preference is, at the expense of the unsecured
creditors of the assignor and holders of certificates in a single bond

7 See
110.

ALGER, MORTGAGE COMPANIES' INVESTIGATION

REPORT (1934) 2, 103,

8 Matter of Lawyers Mortgage Co. (Simon Borg), 151 Misc. 744, 272

N. Y. Supp. 390 (1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 617, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st
Dept. 1934), aff'd, 265 N. Y. 508, 193 N. E. 294 (1934). See RESTATEMENT,
CONTRAcTs

(1932) § 236a.

9 Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171
Atl. 823, aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706 (1934). Contra: Louisville
Title Co. v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736, 61 S. W. (2d) 615 (1933).
10 Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467, 477, 4 N. E. (2d) 830, 835 (1936);
(1937) 37 COL. L. Ray. 1010.
11 Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592,
171 Atl. 823, aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 At. 706 (1934); cf. Presto v.
Morsman, 75 Neb. 358, 372, 106 N. W. 320, 325 (1905).
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and mortgage in which the company holds a large share at the time
of liquidation, preferred over holders of certificates in other bonds
and mortgages in which the company held a smaller share or none
at all.' 2 Since the purchasers of all guaranteed mortgage certificates
relied on the credit standing of the company, 3 and since a substantial part of the company's assets consisted of retained shares, 14 all
certificate holders should have equal rights of satisfaction of their
deficiency claims.
F. D. M.

NEGLIGENcE-THEATREs-FAuLTY

NEGATIVES

NEGLIGENCE CLAIMED

CONSTRUCTION-SAFE

THEREFROM.-The

USE

defendant-

appellant maintains the Strand Theatre on Broadway in the city of
New York. The plans of this theatre were drawn by a competent
architect and were approved by the Building Department. Thereafter, the theatre was inspected annually and its conditions were approved by the said department. On the mezzanine floor, above the
rear section of the orchestra, there was an oval opening surrounded
by a railing thirty-two inches high and five and one-half inches wide.
Two patrons, walking on the mezzanine, were jostled by an unnamed
person and fell over the balustrade onto persons beneath. Three ac7
tions ensued against the defendant, by a person who fell I and two
occupants of the orchestra seats who were struck,2 for the injuries
sustained. From the date of construction to this event, an interval
of about twenty-three years, numerous patrons had passed by the
opening and railing without being injured. Several other theatres
similarly built had been safely used by the public for a period of time.
The theory of the complaints was that the balustrade was insufficient

and that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen the danger.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff on
each action with a modification in the amount of damages recoverable
in one. 3 On appeal, held, reversed, complaints dismissed. The mere
occurrence of the avoidable accident was inadequate to hold the owner
liable for faulty construction, and the constant safe use of the prem'12 N. Y. INSURANcE LAW § 173 as amended by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 318;
see ALGER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 18, 131.
13 ALGER,
4

op. cit. supra note 7, at 94, 103, 110.

Id. at 15; (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 480.

1 Duckowitz v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp., 257 App. Div. 941, 13
(2d) 281 (1st Dept 1939).
2 De Salvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp., 257 App. Div. 941, 13
(2d) 102 (lst Dept 1939); Zussman v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp.,
Div. 941, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 104 (lst Dept. 1939).
3 De Salvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp., 257 App. Div. 941, 13
(2d) 102 (lst Dept. 1939).

N. Y. S.
N. Y. S.
257 App.
N. Y. S.

